
A password manager is one of the few security tools that is both safer and easier than what most people do instead. It creates a different strong password for every account, remembers them all, and fills them in for you. The NCSC, the UK's cyber security agency, and CISA in the US both recommend one. Even the UK Information Commissioner, announcing a £1.2 million fine against LastPass in December 2025, said password managers are "a safe and effective tool for businesses and the public".
They are not risk-free, though, and that fine is a reminder why. This guide covers how a manager protects you, the ways they have actually failed, how Bitwarden, 1Password and the managers built into browsers and phones compare, and what makes a vault hard to break into.
How a password manager protects you
It ends password reuse. When one site leaks its passwords, criminals try them on others. The NCSC's case for a manager is simply that "you can have unique passwords for each service as you won't need to remember them". One leak then exposes one account, not ten.
It encrypts the vault before it leaves your device. The good ones encrypt everything on your phone or computer, with a key made from your master password, and upload only the scrambled result. Bitwarden says the master password is never sent to its servers and that its staff cannot see your passwords. Vendors call this "zero knowledge". The step that turns your master password into a key is deliberately slow: Bitwarden runs it 600,000 times by default, or uses the newer Argon2id method, so each guess costs an attacker real computing time.
It only fills a password in on the site it was saved for. The NCSC points out that "the password will only autofill on the correct website", so a lookalike page gets nothing, however good the copy. Bitwarden, for example, matches on the site's base domain by default. If your manager offers nothing on a page that looks exactly like your bank's, that silence is the warning: check the address rather than searching the vault and pasting the password in. Our guide to phishing covers what to look for.
Can password managers be hacked?
Yes, in several distinct ways. The most serious so far happened to LastPass.
The LastPass breach, and what followed
The ICO's account of the 2022 breach is the clearest. In August 2022 a hacker compromised an employee's laptop and reached LastPass's development environment. The attacker then went after one of four senior employees who held the keys to the backups, getting into their personal computer through a known vulnerability in a third-party streaming service. A keylogger captured that employee's master password, a trusted-device cookie got the attacker past multi-factor authentication, and because the employee's personal and work vaults were linked under a single master password, the work vault gave up the keys to the backup database.
In December 2022 LastPass disclosed that the attacker had copied backups of customer vaults, and its March 2023 update set out what they held. Passwords, usernames and notes were encrypted. The website addresses saved in each vault were not.
An encrypted vault in a criminal's hands can be attacked offline, one guess after another, for as long as they like. How long that takes depends on the master password and on how many times it was run through the slow key step. According to security researcher Wladimir Palant, quoted by KrebsOnSecurity in September 2023, many older accounts used between 1 and 500 rounds, accounts from 2013 used 5,000, and the default only reached 100,100 in 2018 and 600,000 after the breach.
Then the thefts started. In the same report, researchers linked more than $35 million in cryptocurrency stolen from over 150 people; the victims they interviewed had kept wallet recovery phrases in LastPass, though the researchers admitted they could not prove the connection. In March 2025, a US court filing to seize about $24 million recovered from a $150 million theft said investigators had probable cause to believe the thief had used a password stolen from the victim's "online password manager account". In December 2025 the blockchain analysts TRM Labs traced more than $28 million laundered in late 2024 and early 2025, and $7 million more in September 2025, to the same pattern, again by correlation rather than by matching individual accounts. LastPass has said law enforcement has not shown it conclusive evidence connecting any crypto theft to its breach.
The ICO's fine covered personal data of up to 1.6 million UK users: names, email addresses, phone numbers and the stored website addresses. The regulator found LastPass's security measures were not robust enough, and found no evidence that the hacker decrypted customers' passwords.
The lesson for anyone using any manager: once a copy of your vault is stolen, two-step verification does nothing for it. Only the strength of your master password stands between that copy and the attacker. If you ever kept a crypto wallet's recovery phrase in a vault that was taken, treat the wallet as exposed; our guide to checking crypto platforms explains why the phrase is the wallet.
Research that assumes the company's servers are hostile
A study by ETH Zurich and Università della Svizzera italiana, made public in February 2026 and revised in August, asked what happens if attackers take over a password manager's servers outright. It describes 12 attacks against Bitwarden, 7 against LastPass, 6 against Dashlane and 6 against 1Password, most of which could recover passwords. The authors note that "zero knowledge", a term vendors use widely, has no strict technical meaning.
Bitwarden described the issues as medium or low impact and said it had fixed or was fixing seven and accepted three as design decisions. 1Password said the paper showed no new attacks beyond limitations it had already documented, while acknowledging that a compromised server could hand users false keys and that fixing this needs "broader structural work". All of these attacks need control of the company's servers, not just a stolen copy of the data.
Browser extension bugs
At the DEF CON conference in August 2025, researcher Marek Tóth showed that a web page could hide a password manager's autofill menu under a fake cookie banner, so one click on the banner filled in saved details that the page could then read. All 11 managers he tested were vulnerable in their default settings. On a scam site the trick could take card or address details; stealing a login also needed a way to run code on the real site the login belonged to, such as a security flaw.
In his table, last updated in January 2026, Bitwarden is listed as fixed in version 2025.8.2 (31 August 2025), and 1Password and LastPass as still vulnerable. 1Password says there is no comprehensive technical fix for clickjacking. It added optional "Ask before filling" prompts in version 8.11.7.2, had already shown a confirmation the page can't cover before filling cards, and points out that its logins still fill only on the site they were saved for.
Your own device
No encryption helps once malware is running on an unlocked computer, because the vault has to be decrypted for you to use it. The LastPass breach turned on a keylogger planted on an employee's personal computer. Germany's BSI warns that from the password managers built into browsers, malware can extract the access data relatively easily. Updates, and software only from official stores or publishers' own sites, do most of the work here; our safe browsing checklist covers fake downloads.
Bitwarden and 1Password
Bitwarden
Bitwarden's apps are open source, and it publishes third-party audit reports every year; 2025 brought six Cure53 tests, including the browser extension and autofill, plus reviews by ETH Zurich and Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42. It holds SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001 certification. Since release 2026.2.1 it pushes older accounts up to 600,000 rounds of the key step.
The free plan has no limit on passwords or devices, and the Families plan covers up to six people. Hardware security keys work as a second step on the free plan too.
Bitwarden says it has never been breached, which is its own claim. Its closest call was in April 2026, when a malicious version of its command-line tool, used mainly by developers, sat on the npm software registry for about 90 minutes. Bitwarden said it found no evidence that vault data was accessed or that its production systems were compromised. See our current report on bitwarden.com.
1Password
1Password's main difference is the Secret Key: 26 random characters generated on your device when you sign up, a little over 128 bits, which is combined with your password to encrypt the vault. 1Password never has it. Someone who stole data from its servers couldn't check guesses of your password without it; as its security design puts it, even a correct guess wouldn't tell them it was correct. So a weak password, the weakness behind the LastPass thefts, isn't enough on its own to open a stolen copy.
The cost is that nobody can reset it for you. You keep the key in an Emergency Kit, a PDF to print and store somewhere safe, and since June 2024 you can also create a recovery code that lets you set a new password using your email. 1Password has SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 27001 certification, runs a public bug bounty on HackerOne and has annual penetration tests. There is no free plan; the Families plan covers five people. See our current report on 1password.com.
Either is a sound choice. The NCSC's advice holds: "the best password manager to choose is the one that best meets your needs, and which you find easiest to use".
Browser and phone password managers
The manager already in your browser or phone is a reasonable option. Of the browser's offer to save a password, the NCSC says "It's safe for you to do this on your own devices", with two conditions: never on a public or shared computer, and remember that these managers "are only as secure as your devices and accounts".
Apple Passwords. Since iOS 18 and macOS Sequoia, Apple's saved passwords, passkeys and verification codes live in their own Passwords app, which also works in Chrome and Edge on Windows through iCloud for Windows. Passwords in iCloud Keychain are end-to-end encrypted by default, so Apple can't read them.
Google Password Manager. By default Google holds the key that protects your saved passwords. Turning on on-device encryption changes that, so that "no one besides you will be able to access your passwords", but it can't be switched off afterwards, and if you lose every way of unlocking it you lose the passwords. Google's Password Checkup flags saved passwords that are weak or have appeared in breaches.
Anyone who gets into your Apple or Google account, or your unlocked laptop, gets the passwords too, so that account needs its own strong password and two-step verification. And if you switch between an iPhone, a Windows PC and Firefox, a standalone manager is easier than juggling two built-in ones.
How to make your vault harder to break into
Use a long master passphrase, and nowhere else. CISA suggests a passphrase of four to seven unrelated words, at least 16 characters. After LastPass, this matters more than anything: it is the only protection a stolen copy of your vault has, unless you use 1Password's Secret Key.
Turn on two-step verification for the manager itself. The NCSC says that with it, "even if a cyber criminal knows the primary password, they still won't be able to access your account". A hardware security key is the strongest second step; both Bitwarden and 1Password accept one. Keep the codes for your vault account outside the vault, in a separate authenticator app.
Set up recovery before you need it. Print 1Password's Emergency Kit, or save Bitwarden's two-step recovery code: Bitwarden warns that if you lose both the code and your second-step device, you may be locked out of your vault.
Only type your master password into the app or extension. Never into a web page you reached from an email or an advert, however much it looks like your manager's sign-in page.
Keep it updated, and let it lock itself. The clickjacking fixes reached people through updates. Turn on "Ask before filling" or the equivalent where your manager has it, and set the vault to lock after a few minutes idle.
Store more than website logins. Wi-Fi passwords, recovery codes and API keys belong in a vault too, not in a notes app or a chat message. A crypto trading bot is a common example: it trades through exchange accounts you connect to it with API keys, and Darkbot's credentials setup walkthrough shows how each connected exchange account then appears as a "credential", with the balance the bot can trade. A key like that can move money, so keep it in the vault and delete it at the exchange when you stop using the tool.
Use passkeys where a site offers them. The NCSC now recommends making passkeys your first choice, and Apple, Google, Bitwarden and 1Password all store them. Our comparison of passkeys and passwords explains how they differ.
Families and small businesses
Families. Family plans give each person a private vault plus shared ones for things like streaming and utility logins. In 1Password Families, organisers can restore access for a member who forgets their password. Apple shares through Shared Groups, and Google lets you share a password with your family group.
Plan for the worst case too. Apple's Legacy Contacts, who can reach your data after you die, can't access passwords or passkeys in iCloud Keychain. On Bitwarden's paid plans, emergency access lets a trusted person request your vault and receive it after a waiting period you set, unless you turn the request down. 1Password suggests giving a copy of your Emergency Kit to a spouse or the person named in your will.
Small businesses. CISA's advice to employers is that "a company-wide password manager makes it easier for employees to follow best practices". Shared vaults replace the spreadsheet of logins and the passwords sent by email. When someone leaves, remove their access and change every shared password they knew. And learn from the LastPass breach: keep work and personal vaults separate, with different master passwords, and limit the most powerful credentials, such as cloud and banking admin logins, to the few people who need them.
Check the site before you save a login for it
A password manager will save whatever you give it, including a login for a fake shop or a lookalike exchange. Before you create an account somewhere new, check that the website is legit.
verified.fyi collects 200+ facts about a site as soon as you paste its address. For a site asking you to sign up or sign in, that includes:
- whether the domain imitates a well-known site, with lookalike letters or the brand next to words like login;
- whether the homepage asks for a password, card details or a wallet recovery phrase;
- whether Google Web Risk, VirusTotal or abuse.ch's threat feeds flag it for phishing or malware;
- how old the domain is, and whether the pages were copied from another site.
The methodology explains how each check is scored.