
Malware has to be downloaded from somewhere. Before a password stealer or a remote access trojan runs on anyone's computer, someone has to put it on a server, and something has to send the victim there. Malware hosting detection is the work of finding those servers and addresses, and blocking them before the download runs.
That has got harder because the hosting has moved. Criminals still rent their own servers, but much of today's malware is served from places defenders can't simply block: hacked websites, GitHub, OneDrive and Google Drive, and file shares that open like folders on your own computer. Here is where it lives now, how people are sent to it, and how to find and block it.
Where malware is hosted
Hacked websites
A compromised site lends its reputation to whatever is injected into it. Google's threat intelligence team described one operation, tracked as UNC5142, that injected JavaScript into vulnerable WordPress sites through outdated plugins and themes, hiding it in files such as header.php and footer.php or in the site's database. By June 2025 Google had found about 14,000 pages carrying the code.
Visitors saw a fake reCAPTCHA or a Cloudflare error page. The next stage was stored in smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain, which makes it harder for website security tools to spot and block. The landing pages ran on Cloudflare Pages, and the encrypted payloads sat on GitHub and MediaFire.
The owner often doesn't know. Google's spam policies note that hackers often use cloaking, showing search engines and people different content, to make a hack harder for the owner to detect. Blocklists allow for this: Spamhaus's Domain Block List has an "abused-legit" category that lists only the compromised hostname, so one hacked subdomain doesn't sink a whole legitimate domain.
Trusted cloud and code platforms
The other route is to borrow a trusted domain outright. Netskope, whose security service sees the web traffic of the companies using it, found in its Cloud and Threat Report 2026 that each month 12% of organisations detected employees being exposed to malware via GitHub, 10% via Microsoft OneDrive and 5.8% via Google Drive, in data from October 2024 to October 2025. Those addresses are served over HTTPS from domains no company can block wholesale, which is the point.
Two investigations show the scale:
- GitHub behind malicious ads. In March 2025 Microsoft described a campaign that started on illegal film-streaming sites, where ads in hidden frames led through four or five layers of redirects to payloads hosted mainly on GitHub, with others on Discord and Dropbox. It reached nearly a million devices, mostly installing the Lumma and Doenerium password stealers. GitHub took the repositories down.
- Bought popularity. In July 2024 Check Point found more than 3,000 GitHub accounts that starred, forked and watched each other's repositories so malicious ones looked popular and trustworthy. Downloads came in password-protected archives, which many scanners can't look inside, and included Lumma, RedLine and Rhadamanthys.
Discord's file links were popular for the same reason, so in November 2023 Discord said links to files shared outside the platform would expire after 24 hours to stop its servers hosting malware. Microsoft's 2025 Digital Defense Report still lists malware hosted on GitHub and Discord, pushed through ads on busy sites, among the ways attackers got in.
The platforms do act on reports. GitHub's acceptable use policy bans using GitHub to deliver malicious executables while allowing security research, so the right response to a malicious repository is to report and block that URL, not the whole site.
Bulletproof hosting
At the other extreme are hosts that never take anything down. In November 2025 CISA, the FBI, the NSA, the UK's NCSC and partner agencies in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and New Zealand published joint guidance defining a bulletproof hosting provider as one that "knowingly and intentionally markets and leases" its infrastructure to cybercriminals and won't deal in good faith with subpoenas, court orders or abuse complaints. Increasingly these providers resell space leased from legitimate hosts, and when they are blocked they can get a new network number (ASN) within two to five business days and move to it.
Governments have started sanctioning them. The US Treasury sanctioned Russia's Aeza Group on 1 July 2025, saying it hosted operators of the Meduza and Lumma infostealers, BianLian ransomware and RedLine control panels. On 19 November 2025 the US, UK and Australia jointly sanctioned Media Land, which Treasury said had served LockBit, BlackSuit and Play ransomware actors. The same day Treasury designated a UK-registered front company that Aeza had used to move its infrastructure after the first sanctions.
For defenders, Spamhaus publishes free DROP and ASN-DROP lists of address ranges and networks "leased or stolen by professional spam or cyber-crime operations". The CISA guidance names DROP among the free feeds to build a blocklist from.
Open directories and file shares
Some malware sits on servers that simply list their files for anyone to download. Hunt.io, which crawls for these open directories, has documented servers handing out AsyncRAT and Cobalt Strike payloads under throwaway names like 1.exe, and a ZIP archive disguised as f.jpg.
A craftier version uses WebDAV, the protocol that lets Windows open a remote web server as a network folder. In campaigns Proofpoint described in August 2024, an email led to a Windows shortcut that connected to a WebDAV share, sometimes through a search-ms: link, and fetched a shortcut or script that went on to install the Xworm or AsyncRAT trojans. The shares ran behind free TryCloudflare tunnels, each on a random throwaway subdomain. Proofpoint's advice was to allow external file shares only from known, approved servers.
How people are sent to it: ClickFix and fake CAPTCHAs
The most effective lure of the past two years doesn't ask anyone to download a file. ClickFix shows a fake CAPTCHA, browser error or "verify you are human" box, copies a command to the clipboard, and tells the visitor to press Windows+R (or open Terminal on a Mac) and paste it. The command runs PowerShell or mshta.exe, which pulls the payload from wherever it is hosted and often runs it in memory, leaving little on disk.
In Microsoft's 2025 Digital Defense Report, ClickFix was the most common way in that its Defender Experts saw in the year to June 2025: 47% of attacks, ahead of phishing at 35%.
Microsoft's analysis of the technique traces lures arriving by phishing email, through malicious ads on free streaming sites and on hacked legitimate websites, installing Lumma, NetSupport, AsyncRAT and others, and since June 2025 the AMOS stealer on Macs. By late 2024 Proofpoint was seeing it used by many criminal groups and a suspected Russian espionage actor. One campaign posted fake security warnings on GitHub repositories so that GitHub's own notification emails delivered them, reaching at least 300 organisations.
Takedowns help. In May 2025 Microsoft, the US Department of Justice, Europol and Japan's JC3 disrupted Lumma, taking down or blocking about 2,300 domains after Microsoft counted over 394,000 infected Windows computers in two months.
Phones get the same treatment, with a text message standing in for the email: a link to a fake app store, or a bogus banking-app "update" that downloads an Android app file from a web server instead of Google Play. SmishAlert's overview of these mobile delivery vectors covers what follows, from remote-access trojans that abuse Android's accessibility features to fake login screens laid over banking apps.
Indicators worth watching
None of these proves an infection on its own. Two together, or one alongside a user saying "I pasted something", deserve a look.
On the network:
- Executables, scripts, installers or archives downloaded from code and file platforms: raw GitHub content and release downloads, Discord's CDN, Dropbox and Google Drive direct-download links, MediaFire, and static hosts such as
*.pages.dev. Microsoft's report recommends monitoring for abnormal downloads from GitHub or content delivery networks dressed up as popular software. - WebDAV or SMB connections to internet hosts. Few businesses need them, and Proofpoint saw both increasingly used to stage malware.
- Lookups of brand-new domains, and random subdomains of tunnel services such as
trycloudflare.com. - Media files that aren't. UNC5142's loader fetched encrypted payloads named as
.mp4or.wavfiles. - Password-protected archives from unfamiliar sources, a common way past scanners.
On the endpoint:
explorer.exestarting PowerShell,mshta.exeorcmd.exejust after a browser session, the trace a pasted Run-box command leaves. Microsoft suggests checking theRunMRUregistry key, which records Run-box commands, for URLs and fake CAPTCHA text.- Office or a script launching a downloaded program. Microsoft's attack surface reduction rules block exactly this, with rules such as "Block all Office applications from creating child processes" and "Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content".
- Built-in Windows tools behaving oddly, such as
msbuild.exeorregasm.exemaking network connections, or new Defender exclusion folders appearing. Both turned up in the GitHub campaign above.
Free sources for checking a URL, domain or network
Each source sees a different slice of the internet, so check more than one.
- URLhaus, run by abuse.ch with Spamhaus, collects URLs used to distribute malware. It has shared close to four million malware sites and issued over four million takedown notices. Lookups by URL, host or payload hash are free through its API with a free key, and its data also feeds Spamhaus's DBL and Google Safe Browsing.
- ThreatFox, from the same team, collects indicators of compromise such as command-and-control addresses, domains and file hashes. The CISA guidance points to its per-network reports.
- VirusTotal runs a file or URL past more than 70 antivirus scanners as well as URL and domain blocklists. The contents of uploaded files can be shared with its premium customers, so search by file hash rather than uploading an internal document. Scanners also produce false positives, and a clean result on a brand-new file proves little.
- Google Safe Browsing, which Google says protects over five billion devices, has a site status tool for checking an address by hand. Its API is for non-commercial use only; businesses use Web Risk, Google's enterprise version.
- Spamhaus's DBL marks domains used for malware or as botnet controllers, and is free for low-volume, non-commercial use. DROP and ASN-DROP cover whole criminal networks.
- Protective DNS resolvers refuse to look up listed domains, so the site never loads. Quad9 (9.9.9.9) draws on around twenty threat intelligence sources and generates none of its own, and Cloudflare's 1.1.1.2 is its "no malware" resolver. In the UK, the NCSC's own Protective DNS, run by Cloudflare and Accenture since September 2024, covered over 1,400 organisations in government, health and emergency services by April 2024 and had kept users from 1.5 million malicious domains. No DNS filter sees a connection made straight to an IP address, which is one reason to filter by network too.
A detection and response workflow
- Look it up before anyone opens it. Check the URL, host or file hash against URLhaus, ThreatFox, VirusTotal and Safe Browsing, the domain against the DBL, and the IP address against DROP and ASN-DROP. A hit is strong evidence. No hit is not clearance: new addresses can take hours or days to be listed.
- Work out what kind of host it is, because the response differs:
- A legitimate platform (GitHub, Drive, OneDrive, Dropbox): block the exact URL, not the service, and report it to the platform.
- A hacked website: block the hostname and tell the owner or their host.
- A domain the attacker registered: block the domain, and look for its siblings on the same IP addresses or name servers.
- A bulletproof network: filter the range, and follow CISA's advice to keep an audit log of every filter and a way to reverse one that blocks legitimate traffic.
- Find everyone who reached it. Search proxy and DNS logs for other machines that contacted the host, and endpoint records for anything that ran.
- Contain. Isolate any machine that ran a payload. Infostealers such as Lumma take saved passwords, session cookies and autofill data, so change passwords from a clean device and sign out every active session, or the stolen cookies keep working.
- Block and share. Add the indicators to your proxy, DNS filter and firewall, and report the URL to URLhaus and to Google Safe Browsing. Sharing is part of CISA's guidance too, because it helps everyone else block the same host. In the UK, report incidents to the NCSC.
- Harden against the next one. The NCSC's malware guidance recommends blocking known-malicious sites, letting only trusted applications run, and disabling or constraining scripts and macros. Microsoft adds removing the Run box through Group Policy where staff don't need it and turning on PowerShell script block logging, both aimed squarely at ClickFix.
For individuals it's simpler: never paste anything a web page tells you to into Run or Terminal, and treat a download from a link you didn't ask for as suspect, however familiar the site hosting it. Our safe browsing checklist covers browser warnings and downloads, and our guide to phishing covers the messages that start most of these chains.
If your own site is serving malware
You'll often hear it from someone else first: a browser's red warning page, a listing on URLhaus or the DBL, or an email from your host. Google Search Console's Security Issues report names what Google found, such as "Hacked: Malware" or "Hacked: Code injection", with sample pages.
Clean every page, not just the samples: Google says fixing only some pages won't earn a partial return to search results. On WordPress, look where UNC5142 hid its code, in theme files, plugin folders and the database. Update the core software, plugins and themes, change every admin, hosting and database password, then choose Request Review in the report. Reviews can take days or weeks.
Because hacked sites often cloak, check your pages as a visitor arriving from a search, not only by typing your own address. The clean-up is only part of the cost; our piece on reputational risk for small businesses covers the rest.
What verified.fyi checks
verified.fyi checks websites rather than files. Paste an address and we collect 200+ facts about the site, several of them aimed at malware hosting:
- Threat feeds: whether URLhaus or ThreatFox lists the address. Malware still online, or seen recently at high confidence, is a bad signal; a recent listing that is offline or low-confidence is a warning.
- Scanners and blocklists: Google Web Risk, VirusTotal, and Spamhaus's DBL, which separates domains run for malware from legitimate ones that others misused.
- Protective DNS: whether Cloudflare's 1.1.1.2 and Quad9 refuse to look the domain up. Not being blocked earns nothing, since new sites often aren't listed yet.
- Hosting network: whether the site sits on a network on Spamhaus's ASN-DROP, or in a range on DROP.
- File share: a homepage that answers with a WebDAV file listing instead of a web page, the kind of share the campaigns above relied on.
- Search cloaking: we open the homepage again as a visitor from Google Search and as Google's crawler. Search visitors sent to another site when direct visitors aren't is the mark of a hacked site or doorway page.
The methodology explains how each check is scored, and our explainer on how safety verdicts work covers what blocklists can and can't see.